Why asking for part of a 5-byte attribute can read the whole heap (animated)

Finding F1 from the bluetooth scan. Two small numbers, one missing check, and a "please send me a slice" request makes the phone read heap it should never touch. Press Play.

the attribute (5 real bytes, in a 400-byte work buffer) where the 400-byte buffer ends other heap memory right after it mostly-empty buffer / filler

The strip is a 400-byte SDP work buffer. Cells 0..4 are the attribute (type byte + 4 data bytes in the repro). The thick mark is where the buffer ends. Beyond it sits other device memory. Attacker asks for the attribute "starting at byte 300"; the phone does 5 - 300. C promotes both operands to signed int, so that is -295, not 65538, and a negative number is always "smaller than the budget", so memcpy runs with a huge length from offset 300 — a heap over-read. The real tree guards the offset in its SDP server callers; the bug is that the helper itself owns the check, so any future caller that forgets it reintroduces this.